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Financial stability is paramount for promoting low-carbon transition. In order to achieve Paris 
Agreement’s goals, low-carbon or ‘green’ investments are required worldwide (e.g. UNFCCC 
2015). According to International Energy Agency (IEA), the current level of low-carbon 
investment is inadequate. In fact, additional 48 trillion USD are estimated to be necessary over 
the period 2020-2035 (IEA 2011). Besides, 3.5 trillion USD investment per year in the energy 
sector would be necessary up to 2050 (IEA, 2017). This means that the current level of green 
investment should be nearly doubled. In addition, appropriate policies to allocate private and 
public funds are required to boost green investment growth and trigger synergies among 
sectors and institutions. Several policies, mechanisms and incentives are to be implemented 
for promoting low-carbon assets and to share investment risks between private and public 
actors. For instance, some programmes have been undertaken to align the financial system 
with climate goals (UNEP, 2014). These strategies and other climate policies are expected to 
affect private investors’ behaviour in the next decades (e.g. Ameli, et al. 2017; Boissinot et al. 
2016). The importance of low-carbon-oriented finance to achieve long-term sustainable 
growth has been recognised by world-leading institution, including the High-Level Expert 
Group on Sustainable Finance (European Commission 2016). However, the volume of 
scientific studies on the effect of green finance and low-carbon investment on climate change 
is still limited – as reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report (IPCC 
2018). Current understanding and opinions about how to channel more capitals towards green 
investment are also incomplete and quite contentious (e.g. Gupta et al. 2014).  
 In the attempt to contribute to this debate, we developed an ecological open-economy stock-
flow consistent (SFC) model. The model enables us to test cross-area interactions among 
productive sectors, financial markets and the ecosystem. We aim at identifying possible 
transmission channels of climate risk, that is, the impact of global warming on the real 
economy, financial institutions and financial instruments. We also assess potential 
implications of policies aiming at alleviating the expected impact of climate change on 
economic variables, while mitigating climate-related financial risks. More precisely, we show 
that the unequal technical progress across areas, coupled with rising ecological awareness, 
can force governments of less ecologically-efficient areas to reduce cross-border transactions 
and move further away from green technologies. Monetary and fiscal policies can help counter 
these tendencies. Unlike most climate finance authors, we highlight the stabilising role of fiscal 
policies, as a complement of monetary policy. In line with Deleidi and Mazzucato (2018) and 
Deleidi et al. (2019), we posit that mission-oriented government spending is fundamental in 
defining the level of private green capital accumulation. We also consider the impact of 
selective credit rationing favouring green investment plans over conventional investment (e.g. 
Dafermos et al. 2018). However, possible side effects, linked with the impact of cross-border 
financial flows and output growth rate differentials on exchange rates, must be carefully 
considered and addressed. Looking at the theoretical foundations, our contribution builds 
upon the most recent literature on ecological macroeconomics and climate finance. While 
there are several methodological affinities, we depart from the existing literature in that we 
focus on cross-border (or cross-area) effects and interactions. We do so by using a model in 
which the world economy is likened to two interacting autonomous open systems. We use a 
brand-new method of determination of the exchange rate. This is a crucial variable, as it 
transmits the impulses from financial (and real) international transactions to the domestic 
economy and the broad ecosystem.  
3 
 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide a short review of most 
recent literature on ecological macroeconomics modelling and climate finance. In section 3, 
we present the most relevant theoretical and methodological aspects of our contribution. We 
discuss the key features of our ecological open-economy model. We then use the model to 
analyse the impact of selected global warming-related shocks on key economic, financial and 
ecological variables. Our tentative findings are presented and discussed in section 4. We 
argue that, without a cross-area policy coordination plan, international financial flows, output 
growth rate differentials and the related exchange rate adjustments are likely to bring about 
unintended consequences, undermining green policies’ effectiveness. Additional remarks are 
made in section 5.     
2. Literature review 
An increasing number of (either aggregative or microfounded) ecological and climate finance 
models have been developed in the last decade. These models aim at: 
a) Detecting sustainable growth conditions and questioning the growth imperative (e.g. 
Jackson and Victor 2015 and Richters and Siemoneit 2017); 
b) Studying the energy sector (e.g. Naqvi 2015, Berg et al. 2015);  
c) Investigating the trajectories of key environmental, macroeconomic and financial 
variables (e.g. Dafermos et al. 2017, 2018);  
d) Analysing the impact of green fiscal policies and ‘green sovereign bonds’ (e.g.  
Monasterolo and Raberto 2018; Bovari et al. 2018);  
e) Examining the interaction between climate change and financial stability (e.g. 
Dafermos et al. 2018);  
f) Assessing the impact of State-led innovation policies on climate change and other 
ecological variables (e.g. Mazzucato 2015; Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018; Deleidi et 
al. 2019); 
g) Addressing the questions of how to finance the transaction towards a ‘greener’ 
economy (e.g. Campiglio 2016; Ameli et al. 2017; Rademaekers et al. 2017) and how 
to tackle climate risks (e.g. Aglietta and Espagne 2016; Bardoscia et al. 2017; Battiston 
et al. 2017; Bovari et al. 2018; Dafermos et al. 2018).   
More precisely, Jackson and Victor (2015) raise the question whether growth is necessary for 
capitalist economies to survive. In other words, they check whether a ‘growth imperative’ 
exists, which is determined by the need for the borrowers to pay back the interests due on the 
stock of outstanding debt. For this purpose, they use a SFC dynamic macro-economic model 
accounting for the credit creation process led by banks and private equity in a closed economy. 
They find no evidence of a ‘growth imperative’. In addition, they show how an economy can 
move from a growth to a stationary (or nongrowing) path. They argue that the countercyclical 
spending carried out by governments can promote such a transition by smoothing and 
dampening the oscillations associated with it. 
 Similarly, Richters and Siemoneit (2017) analyse several SFC post-Keynesian models and 
question the idea of positive interest rates as the main responsible for the ‘growth imperative’. 
Particularly, a stationary state economy – characterised by zero net saving and investment – 
is compatible with positive interest rates. The paper confirms the idea of a debt-based 
monetary system that does not cause any growth imperative. A stationary state is generated 
by positive net saving and net investment decisions, which are permanently above zero, and 
not by a systemic and inevitable necessity. 
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 Naqvic (2015) proposes a multi-sectoral SFC model for a closed economy. Production is 
demand-led and the economy is made up of several institutional sectors (firms, energy, 
households, government, and financial institutions), which interplay with the environment. The 
model is calibrated on the European economy and aims at evaluating the effect of five 
alternative environmental economic policies (i.e. a de-growth scenario, a capital stock damage 
function, a carbon tax, a higher share of low-emissions renewable energy, and an investment 
in technical innovation) on three main challenges (trilemma): (i) boosting output growth; (ii) 
fostering employment growth with a more equal distribution; or (iii) improving environmental 
sustainability. The study is motivated by a trilemma that European policy makers are currently 
facing. Naqvic’s findings show that four out of five policies cannot solve the three challenges 
simultaneously. Only the investment in innovative technologies can increase output, foster 
employment (and wage growth), while reduce CO2 emissions. 
 A multi-sectoral ecological SFC model is also employed by Berg et al. (2015), who integrate 
the stock-flow analysis with the input-output methodology. This allows to model to detect the 
interaction among three types of flow variables: (i) monetary flows in the financial system; (ii) 
flows of goods and services produced by the real economy; and (iii) the flow of physical 
materials related to the natural environment. These models are more flexible than standard 
aggregate SFC models, for they allow modelling a variety of sectors. The model developed by 
Berg et al. (2015) considers an economy made up of five sectors: the government sector, the 
banking system, the household sectors, and two industrial sectors that produce energy and 
goods. The main findings of the paper can be summarised as follows: (i) a nongrowing 
economy can be associated with positive interest rates; (ii) an increase in energy prices can 
negatively affect the economic system by lowering real wages and aggregate demand, thus 
triggering a recession. Overall, the model shows hot to integrate heat emissions due to 
economic activities and climate change modelling. 
 Dafermos et al. (2017) develop a stock-flow-fund ecological macroeconomic model 
calibrated on global data, which combines a standard SFC framework with the flow-fund 
approach developed by Georgescu-Roegen. The authors assume that output is demand-led 
and finance is non-neutral. This allows considering the channels through which the monetary 
system, the real economy and the ecosystem interact. Supply constraints are determined by 
the exhaustion of natural resources and by environmental damages. Climate change is 
included in the analysis and affects aggregate demand through the influence of catastrophes, 
global warming, and health issues on the desired level of investment, savings, consumption 
and potential output. The analysis focuses on two types of green finance policy: (i) a reduction 
in interest rates and the relaxing of credit rationing criteria on green loans; (ii) a reduction in 
interest rates and the relaxing of credit rationing criteria on green loans, combined with tighter 
conditions on conventional types of loans. The second policy generates better environmental 
results than the first one, because of the lower economic growth rate. More precisely, it is 
associated with a lower output level combined with a larger share of green investment, lower 
CO2 emissions and lower atmospheric temperature. Finally, the leverage ratio of firms is lower 
under the second scenario, despite the lower economic growth rate. This is because damages 
due to global warming reduce as the share of green loans increases. 
 In a more recent paper, Dafermos et al. (2018) assess and investigate the existing links 
between climate change and financial (in)stability. By using a stock-flow-fund macro model, 
the authors argue that an increase in the average temperature can be detrimental for firms’ 
profitability and financial stability, possibly leading to a higher default rate and increasing the 
risk of systemic bank losses. The authors focus on the physical risks implied by climate 
change. They maintain that ‘climate-induced financial instability reinforces the adverse effects 
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of climate change on economic activity’ (Dafermos et al., 2018, p. 220). In addition, they 
consider the impact of global worming on households’ portfolio choices. The latter tend to be 
diverted towards ‘safer’ and more liquid assets (because of the impact on economic agents’ 
confidence), such as deposits and government bonds, causing in this way a decrease in 
corporate bonds’ prices. To tackle the financial instability triggered by climate change, a green 
quantitative easing program, regarded as a long-term industrial policy, is proposed and 
discussed. The authors analyse a hypothetical scenario where central banks decide to buy a 
quarter of total green bonds worldwide. The policy’s effectiveness is shown to vary according 
to the parameters of the model. More precisely, a crucial role is played by the sensitivity of 
investment in green capital assets to the differential between green bonds’ and conventional 
bonds’ yields. However, green QE policies usually help counter financial instabil ity. Investment 
financing turns out to be less dependent on bank credit, and hence less subject to credit crunch 
risks. Moreover, slower climate change implies a reduced degree of economic damages. As 
a consequence, firms’ profitability is restored, liquidity problems are dampened, and the 
default ratio decreases. 
 The model developed by Deleidi et al. (2018) is based on four different theoretical 
approaches: (i) the Sraffian supermultiplier model; (ii) the Neo-Schumpeterian framework 
which emphasises the entrepreneurial role of the State; (iii) the SFC approach to macro-
economic modelling; (iv) and recent developments in ecological economics literature aiming 
at cross-breeding post-Keynesian theories with more traditional ecological framework. The 
paper aims at developing a simple analytical tool that can help examine: (i) the impact of 
innovation on economic growth and the ecosystem; and (ii) the impact of ecological feedbacks 
on economic growth and government spending effectiveness. The authors find that, in 
principle, government can be successful in supporting innovation and growth while slowing 
down natural reserves’ depletion rates and tackling climate change. This requires targeting 
green innovations policies characterised by the highest ecological efficiency gains. More 
precisely, the State can actively promote green innovation, thus driving a change in the overall 
economic structure. However, ecological feedbacks affect government policy effectiveness. In 
addition, it is argued that the policy-makers are likely to be facing a conundrum in the next 
decade: green innovation allows for lower matter-, energy- and CO2-intensity coefficients, but 
the higher investment and production levels may well frustrate these efficiency gains. 
 Bovari et al. (2018) combine a SFC approach with a dynamic predator-prey of (Lotka-
Volterra) model. They analyze the challenges posed by climate change in conjunction with 
private indebtedness. The starting point of the analysis is as follows: climate-change mitigation 
is an expensive process and, given the multiple constraints imposed on public finances, the 
private sector is expected to carry out most of the burden. However, this can lead to a further 
explosion of private debt and trigger financial instability. The latter is co-caused by global 
warming and private indebtedness. The proposed policy approach consists in pricing carbon 
emissions through a carbon tax, which should incentivize firms to devote part of their 
production to the abatement of emissions. The authors conclude that, in spite of the +2° C 
target being plausibly already out of reach, an adequate carbon tax can be conducive to a 
reduction in carbon emissions and to the achievement of the +2.5°C objective. This result can 
be obtained without affecting economic growth, as long as adequate policies aiming at 
increasing the wage share and fostering the employment rate are also set in motion. 
 Monasterolo and Raberto (2018) propose a mix of fiscal and monetary policies (green 
sovereign bonds) that aim at tackling climate change. The analytical tool used to conduct the 
analysis is the so-called EIRIN model. The latter is a SFC model with neo-Schumpeterian 
insights, where the supply side is defined through a Leontief production function. In addition, 
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the economy is made up of ‘heterogeneous economic sectors and subsectors characterized 
by adaptive behaviours and expectations (households, firms), heterogeneous capital goods 
characterized by different resource intensity, a credit sector characterized by endogenous 
money creation, and a foreign sector’ (Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018, p. 229). The 
simulations show that green sovereign bonds significantly contribute to green investment and 
help reducing the import of raw materials. However, the implementation of this monetary policy 
can imply a short-run trade-off between positive effects in terms of green transition and the 
risk of wealth concentration. Focusing on green fiscal policies, incentives and taxes, climate 
change mitigation can come at the cost of negative feedbacks on the economy (for instance, 
in terms of an increase in the unemployment rate). 
 Finally, Campiglio (2016) analyses how the banking system and macroprudential policies 
can support low-carbon investments through selective funding. Other authors (e.g. Ameli et 
al. 2017, and Rademaekers et al. 2017) focus on the role played by different classes of 
investors, notably, institutional investors, pension funds and insurance companies. The effects 
of ‘transition’ and ‘physical’ risks (due to climate change) on the stability of the financial system 
are considered, among others, by Aglietta and Espagne (2016), Bardoscia et al. (2017), 
Battiston et al. (2017), Bovari et al. (2018) and Dafermos et al. (2018). Overall, it is argued 
that climate change is likely to have severe implications for the stability of the financial system 
in the next decades, by increasing bankruptcy rates, leading to ‘flight to safety’ behaviours, 
and worsening credit conditions. The impact of a variety of monetary policies (e.g. green QE 
programmes and selective credit) is analysed. There is a general agreement that green 
monetary policies can smooth climate-induced financial instability, although they can only slow 
down global warming.   
3. Theory and method 
3.1 Model features and key assumptions 
Our work innovates relative to the existing literature in that it focuses on (side) effects of 
international or cross-border financial flows. The formal tool we developed and used belongs 
to the class of stock-flow consistent (SFC) dynamic macroeconomic models. Unlike financial 
instability, ecological aspects were not initially covered by Godley and Lavoie (2007a) and 
early SFC works (e.g. Caverzasi and Godin 2015; Nikiforos and Zezza 2017). Arguably, 
ecological SFC models represent one of the most significant internal developments in that 
literature (e.g. Carnevali et al. 2019). While some ecological and climate finance SFC models 
have been developed in the last decade, they usually focus on a single-country or single-area 
economy. However, local impacts of climate change and natural resources’ depletion are likely 
to be unequal across countries. Besides, when climate risk-related financial shocks hit an 
area, this can bring about indirect effects for other countries or areas – because of the 
interconnections of the balances of payments and the stock markets. To shed light on this yet-
unexplored aspect, we developed an ecological open-economy or two-area SFC model. The 
model is an advanced version of the simple prototype presented by Carnevali et al. (2019). Its 
basic structure is made up of 225 equations and two redundant equilibrium conditions. 
Exogenous variables and parameters are 132. The full set of identities, equilibrium conditions 
and behavioural equations is displayed in the Appendix, while coefficient values are displayed 
by Table 5.  
 The key features of our model can be summarised as follows: 
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a) We divide the world economy in two main areas, named Greenland and Brownland, 
respectively. 
b) Each domestic household sector is made up of two social groups or classes: the 
recipients of labour incomes (the workers) and the recipients of entrepreneurial and 
financial incomes (the capitalists). 
c) While the workers can only hold their savings in form of cash (domestic currency) and 
bank deposits, capitalists can diversify their portfolios by purchasing domestic and 
foreign government bills and/or firms’ shares (see Fig. 1, charts g and h). 
d) Initial values of economic and financial stocks, and the related parameter values, are 
identical across areas (e.g. GDPs, wealth stocks, propensities to consume, return 
rates, etc.). 
e) Both economies are demand-led in the short- and long-run. There is no constrain on 
the supply side, except for the availability of natural reserves and the impact of global 
warming. All variables are expressed at constant prices.    
f) Productive firms can undertake both conventional investment and low-carbon or green 
investment. The latter can be supported (or not) by the government sector. 
g) Current accounts are balanced in the baseline scenario, while government budgets 
are not (both government sectors record a small deficit indeed). 
h) There is a floating exchange rate regime. As a result, it is the ebb and flow of the 
market that determine the relative price of the currencies. We will argue that financial 
flows play an essential role (along with cross-area output growth rate differentials).    
i) Natural resources endowments (matter and energy) are identical across areas. Each 
area can only access its own reserves. However, ecological policies of each area can 
affect the other area both via the balance of payment channel and through changes in 
the average temperature (due to industrial CO2 emissions). 
j) Unlike economic and financial coefficients, techniques of production are different: 
compared to Brownland, Greenland is marked by lower CO2-, energy- and matter-
intensity coefficients, and a higher share of renewable energy to total energy (see 
Table 5). 
In formal terms, assumptions (a) to (j) result in eighteen blocks of equations (see Appendix). 
The first block – equations (1) to (16) – defines disposable income and net wealth of 
households in each area. This is quite standard in SFC literature, except for equations (3)-(5) 
and (10)-(12), which account for the revaluation of foreign currency-denominated financial 
assets generated by changes in the exchange rate.1 The second block – equations (17) to 
(38) – defines domestic consumption levels and income shares. Notice that equations (30) 
and (37) determine the cross-border net flows of profits (dividends) between the two areas. 
The third block – equations (39) to (60) – defines investment plans of firms and capital 
accumulation. Equations (45) to (48) are the most important in defining private investment 
dynamics of the first area considered. Taken together, equations (45) and (46) hold that 
productive firms invest as long as their current stock of capital is below a target level, defined 
as a percentage of output. The speed of adjustment is inversely related to credit rationing 
factors, meaning inversely related to the interest rate on loans and firms’ leverage ratios, and 
positively related to banks’ liquidity ratios and the share of green investment to total investment 
– see equations (221) and (223). Equation (47) defines private green investment as a share 
of output plus two additional components depending on government green spending and the 
                                                 
1 Capital gains due to changes in the market values of shares are implicitly considered, as portfolio equations 
determine nominal demanded (and supplied) stocks of shares, inclusive of price revaluation effects.  
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interest rate on (green) loans, respectively. In line with Deleidi and Mazzucato (2018) and 
Deleidi et al. (2019), we posit that mission-oriented government spending is crucial in defining 
the level of private green capital accumulation.2 The latter improves the ecological efficiency 
of the productive system (lower matter-, energy and CO2-intensity ratios and higher recycling 
rate). It is implicitly assumed that, first, the firms choose the amount of optimal investment; 
second, they set the share of it to be devoted to green investment; third, they calculate the 
amount of conventional investment as a residual level. This is the meaning of equation (48). 
Identical considerations go for equations (56) to (59), which are referred to the other area. The 
fourth block define imports and exports for the two areas. The fifth block – equations (65) to 
(82) – defines households’ portfolio equations. Six types of financial instruments are 
considered: cash, bank deposits, domestic government bills, foreign bills, shares issued by 
domestic firms and foreign shares. Workers can only hold cash and deposits, while capitalists 
are also allowed to hold domestic and foreign bills and/or shares. Capitalists’ portfolio choices 
are made based on standard Tobinesque principles. Bank deposits are the residual asset. 
The sixth block – equations (83) to (98) – shows that government bills’ supplies adjust 
smoothly to nominal demand, while, in the stock market, prices are determined in such a way 
to match nominal demands with supplies (based on investment plans). The seventh block – 
equations (99) to (114) – defines the banking sector in a quite conventional way: in each area, 
commercial banks grant loans to domestic firms and ‘collect’ deposits from households. They 
can also purchase government bills and borrow from central banks (advances). Bank profit is 
simply the amount of interests perceived on their asset holdings (loans and government bills), 
as the interest rate accruing on the liabilities (deposits and central bank’s advances) is null. 
The eight block – equations (115) to (124) – shows that central banks act as lenders of last 
resorts for both commercial banks and governments. In fact, this is the way cash is created 
and inputted into the system.3 Each government sector can undertake two different types of 
spending: green spending and conventional spending. Like the latter, the former does not 
influence ecological efficiency directly. However, unlike the latter, it triggers a green innovation 
cascade, as it supports private green investment. The ninth block defines the exchange rate. 
More precisely, equations (125) and (126) show that a floating exchange rate is used, which 
can be simply thought as the relative price of the two currencies. In other words, the exchange 
rate is determined by demand and supply forces, considering both the real side (the trade 
balance) and the financial side (financial incomes in the current account and the financial 
account).4 Blocks ten to fourteen – equations (127) to (190) – are devoted to the ecosystem 
and its interactions with the financial and productive sectors. The way we model these 
relationships resembles the method proposed by Dafermos et al. (2017, 2018; see also 
Carnevali et al. 2019, and Deleidi et al. 2019). The main points are as follows. The tenth and 
eleventh block track the evolution over time of matter and energy reserves, where recycling 
and renewable sources of energy are also considered. The twelfth block defines the change 
in global atmospheric temperature as a simple function of CO2 emissions in the two areas. 
                                                 
2 In fact, the second and third components of equation (47) can be regarded as defining the share of 
green investment that private firms would not be undertaking if they were not supported by the State or 
by privileged credit conditions, respectively. 
3 We assume that commercial banks hold no idle balances of high-power money (reserves) at the 
central bank. 
4 Notice that perfect capital mobility is assumed, but capital substitutability is not. In other words, 
economic agents make their portfolio choices based on relative return rates on assets. However, 
differences in return rates are persistent, because assets are not perfect substitutes. There is no return 
rate equalisation tendency.  
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The thirteenth block defines ecological efficiency in an endogenous way. More precisely, 
matter-, energy- and CO2-intensity coefficients of each area are determined by the share of 
green capital to total capital stock. Similarly, national renewable energy shares grow as the 
shares of green capital stock grow. Besides, block fourteen holds that both working-class 
households’ propensities to consume (out of income) and capital depreciation rates depend 
on climate change. The reason is that extreme weather conditions, catastrophes and 
uncertainty can undermine the pace of capital accumulation. In addition, uncertainty and rising 
ecological awareness can affect consumption and/or incentive hoarding behaviours. The last 
four blocks – equation (191) to (225) – contain auxiliary equations, which are used to define 
domestic and foreign balances, inequality indices within areas, additional financial indices, 
and credit rationing variables, respectively. 
       
3.2 Calibration and experiments 
Economic parameters of each area are taken from standard SFC modelling literature or 
calibrated to obtain a ‘real world’ baseline. The ecological part of the model is based on 
Dafermos et al. (2017, 2018) and IPCC (2018), instead.5 More precisely, model coefficients 
are set in such a way to obtain a gross world output equal to 80 trillion ca of currency units 
(say, USD) in the baseline scenario. World output grows steadily up until 2020 and then 
stabilises. Under the baseline, total financial assets (liabilities) are roughly 1.3 times the gross 
world output (i.e. more than 100 trillion of USD) in 2020.6 As a result, the baseline output of a 
single block roughly amounts to the combined GDPs of the two biggest economic areas 
worldwide, namely, the United States and the European Union. Likewise, the other block can 
be likened to the rest of the world’s economy.7 In line with IPCC report, worldwide annual 
industrial CO2 emissions are 46 billion Gt ca in 2020 baseline (from 15 billion GT ca in the late 
1960s). They are expected to drop to 15 billion Gt per year in 2060. Cumulative emissions are 
2,100 billion Gt ca in 2020 (from 700 billion Gt ca in the late 1960s), and are expected to 
stabilise at 3,100 Gt ca in 2060. As a result, the average atmospheric temperature in 2020 is 
+1.5C above its level in the 1950s, and is expected to be +2C in 2060 (or > 2.5C ca in the 
‘business as usual’ scenario). Matter resources are calculated in such a way to match 390,000 
Gt ca in 2015, while matter reserves are 6,000 Gt ca in the same year. Energy resources are 
540,000 Ej ca, whereas energy reserves are 39,000 Ej ca. The socio-economic stock for the 
world economy is 1,140 Gt ca in the baseline. Fig. 1 displays baseline values and trends for 




                                                 
5 See Table 5 for the full set of coefficient values, initial values of stocks and lagged endogenous 
variables. The balance sheet and the transactions-flow matrix for the two areas are displayed by Table 
1 and Table 2, respectively. The physical stock-flow and the flow matrices are displayed by Table 3 and 
Table 4. We are happy to provide our model’s program file upon request. 
6 Arguably, this value is lower than the actual amount of financial assets, which is estimated to be 
around 160 trillion USD worldwide (i.e. twice size world output).  
7 Since the purpose of our paper is theoretical, no specific geographic meaning should be attributed to 
Greenland and Brownland. In fact, our labels only define different techniques of production. 
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Baseline values were obtained by running the model from 1952 to 2020, and then up to 2150, 
on an annual basis. We used the model to test the reaction of selected economic, financial 
and ecological variables to the following events or shocks linked with global warming:8 
1. Preference for ‘safer’ financial assets. Higher risk aversion and hoarding behaviours 
can result from the increase in the frequency of natural catastrophes. We test the effect 
of investors’ flight to safety.  
2. Preference for ‘greener’ financial assets. This can be the effect of a higher ecological 
awareness of the population. We test the effect of investors reducing their holdings of 
Brownland’s assets, while increasing Greenland’s.  
3. Preference for ‘greener’ products. A higher ecological awareness can lead consumers 
to turn to low-impact products, ‘zero kilometre’ food, etc. We test the effect of the 
decision of both Greenland’s and Brownland’s households to reduce their consumption 
of goods made in Brownland, while increasing Greenland’s.  
4. Brownland’s austerity (and autarchy) measures. Green policies – e.g. green incentives 
– lead Brownland’s private sector to import ‘greener’ products and intermediate goods 
from Greenland. This affects Brownland’s trade balance and therefore the government 
budget balance. Hence the decision of Brownland policy-makers to address the twin 
deficit by cutting green incentives. We test the effect of this policy option.  
5. Selective credit rationing. A way to boost green investment is to reduce interest rate 
on loans used for low-carbon production and investment purposes. We test the effect 
of it in Brownland.  
6. Increase of green government spending. Another, more direct, way to boost low-
carbon investment is to support it through active fiscal policies, aiming at generating a 
green innovation cascade. We test the effect of these policies on both Greenland and 
Brownland.  
4. Results and discussion 
We used our model to analyse the effects of the above ‘possible worlds’, treated as shocks to 
exogenous variables and/or parameter values (see Table 5). We focused on implications for 
economic activity, financial stability and the ecosystem. Overall, it is shown that, when cross-
border effects are considered, many unexpected and unintended results show up. The main 
reason is that international financial flows and output growth rate differentials modify the 
relative price of currencies (i.e. the exchange rate), thereby affecting the real economy and 
the ecosystem, hence the financial sector. 
 Preference for ‘safer’ assets (Fig. 2). The decision of investors to move from risky to safer 
financial assets is one of the most frequently reported effects of uncertainty. It is usually 
associated with the higher frequency of adverse meteorological conditions. The resulting flight 




For instance, both Greenland’s and Brownland’s households (capitalists, in our model) may 
want to reduce the portion of shares held in their portfolios. They can replace firms’ shares 
with liquidity and/or government bills. Whatever the specific mix chosen, output (GDP) benefits 
from that change if the portion of idle balances (including both cash and deposits) reduces, 
                                                 
8 Shocks are all run in 2025. 
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despite the lower amount of equity. By contrast, output is negatively affected if the overall 
portion of liquidity increases. This is the case displayed by Fig. 2a. The point is that financial 
assets are not perfect substitutes. Consequently, nonlinear effects are possible when 
economic agents redefine their portfolios. Fig. 2j and 2k shows that, in the case considered, 
the percentage of cash increases, along with the portion of domestic bills. The portions of 
shares and foreign bills fall, and so does the portion of banks deposits (which are replaced 
with ‘more’ cash). Notice that the lower output does not necessarily harm government budget. 
In fact, it can bring about an improvement of it if central banks act as lenders of last resort – 
Fig. 2b. The reason is that a higher portion of bills are now held by the central banks, whose 
profits (i.e. seigniorage incomes, which are transferred to the government sector) can offset 
the fall in tax revenues. In addition, the lower absolute level of asset holdings (including bills) 
held by households help reducing the interest burden for the government. If households’ 
behaviour is symmetrical across areas, balance of payments’ entries are not affected, neither 
is the exchange rate – Fig. 2b, 2i and 2l. This is one of the few cases where international 
financial flows play no role. Looking at the ecosystem, a lower output entails lower CO2 
emissions and thus a lower average temperature relative to the baseline – Fig. 2c, 2d and 2e. 
However, the financial sector does not benefit from it. Fig. 2f and 2g show that firms’ leverage 
ratios are now higher and their valuation ratios (as expressed by Tobin’s q) lower compared 
to baseline values. Similarly, banks’ liquidity ratios are worse off in the new scenario, because 
bank deposits fall more rapidly than loans – Fig. 2h. In short, a flight to safety can improve 
ecological indices, but affects private sector’s financial condition. The net impact on the 
government sector depends on the role played by central banks, instead. 
 Preference for ‘greener’ assets (Fig. 3). Climate change can induce investors of both areas 
to reduce their holdings of Brownland’s financial assets (including both shares and bills), while 
increasing Greenland’s – Fig. 3j and 3k. Our experiments show that Greenland’s economy 




The adjustment in the exchange rate is the key variable here. Under a floating regime, the 
higher flows of capitals from Brownland to Greenland result in an appreciation of Greenland’s 
currency – see Fig. 3b and 3i. Greenland’s current account (which is nothing but the opposite 
of Brownland’s current account displayed by Fig. 3b) worsens, because of the fall in net export 
coupled with the fall in net incomes (dividends and interest payments) – Fig. 3b and 3l. This 
affects Greenland’s GDP – Fig. 3a. The increase in Brownland’s output almost offsets the 
reduction in Greenland’s output. Unfortunately, this goes along with higher CO2 emissions, 
due to the lower ecological efficiency of Brownland’s firms, and thus higher temperature in the 
short to medium run – Fig. 3c, 3d and 3e. Looking at the domestic financial side, Brownland’s 
firms increase their leverage ratio, while Greenland’s firms are forced to deleverage – Fig. 3f 
and 3g. This is reflected in banks’ liquidity ratios – Fig. 3h. In short, under a floating exchange 
rate regime, a higher preference for green financial assets can harm, rather than safeguard, 
the ecosystem, while boosting financial imbalances. Notice that Greenland GDP would be 
virtually unaffected by capital in-flows under a fixed exchange rate regime. The reason is that 
its financial account surplus would result in the accumulation of international reserves, not in 
the appreciation of Greenland currency.9 
                                                 
9 See Fig. 3b displaying the same shock under a fixed exchange rate regime, where central banks 
stabilise exchange rates by accumulating or reducing gold reserves (or the ‘anchor currency’). All in all, 
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 Preference for ‘greener’ products (Fig. 4). Arguably, the impact of consumers reducing their 
demand for “made in Brownland” (and/or increasing their demand for “made in Greenland”) is 




Both Greenland’s economy and the ecosystem benefit from greener consumption habits 
worldwide – Fig. 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d and 4e. The aggregate liquidity ratio of Greenland’s banks 
worsens, but this is due to their higher lending activity. The leverage ratio of Greenland’s 
productive sector is also higher, but the increase in firms’ valuation ratio outstrips the former 
– Fig. 4g and 4h. Looking at their portfolios, households now hold more liquid assets, because 
of the increase in money demand for transaction and precautionary motives – Fig. 4j and 4k. 
It is worth stressing that Brownland’s economy is expected to recover in the medium to long 
run, despite the initial negative impact. For the strong depreciation of Brownland currency 
ends up boosting its net export and net incomes (dividends and interest payments) from 
Greenland – Fig. 4a, 4b, 4i and 4l. However, Brownland records a twin deficit in the short run 
when consumers turn to green products.10     
 Brownland’s austerity (and autarchy) measures (Fig. 5). For Brownland’s policy makers, a 
possible way to counter the twin deficit is to pursue a contractionary fiscal policy. This 
intervention is more effective when targets green incentives and other types of green 




It is no surprise that austerity measures in Brownland are associated with a fall in Brownland’s 
output. Fig. 5a shows that Greenland’s economy is also affected, because of the reduction its 
export to Brownland. Focusing on rebalancing effects, austerity is effective. Both government 
budget and current account balance of Brownland benefit from government cuts – Fig. 5b. 
However, as Fig. 5i and 5l shows, the appreciation of the currency ends up undermining 
Brownland products’ competiveness, thereby depressing further the economy. The lower 
world output entails lower CO2 emissions and thus a lower average temperature, relative to 
the baseline – Fig. 5c, 5d and 5e. Looking at the financial side, all indices show a worsening 
for both firms and banks based in Brownland. Households also reduce sharply their assets 
holdings. These trends can be interpreted as the beginning of a financial crisis triggered by 
the economic recession – Fig. 5f, 5g, 5h, 5j and 5k.12 Austerity cures the disease, but kills the 
patient. 
 Selective credit rationing (Fig. 6). Instead of pursuing (green) austerity measures, 
Brownland’s policy-makers can try to boost green investment. For instance, they can lower 
the interest rate on green loans (that is, loans funding low-carbon investment plans). 
   
[FIGURE 6] 
 
                                                 
the importance of exchange rate adjustments can be appreciated by looking at Fig. 8, where the market 
value of Greenland currency (i.e. Brownland exchange rate) under all considered scenarios is plotted. 
10 See Fig. 4b displaying the same shock under a fixed exchange rate regime.  
11 The link between Brownland’s green government spending and the propensity to import is captured 
by equation (225) in our model. 
12 See Fig. 5b displaying the same shock under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
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In our model, selective credit rationing is effective because of a four-fold relationship: first, 
firms adjust their investment to reach the optimal capital to output ratio; second, green 
investment grows as interest rate reduces; third, interest rate reduces, and the speed of capital 
adjustment increases, as the share of green investment to total investment grows; fourth, 
conventional investment is a residual variable.13 As a result, there is a cumulative causation 
linking low interest rates and high green investments. If banks incentive green investment 
(either voluntarily or by law) there is a beneficial, though temporary, effect on Brownland’s 
output – Fig. 6a. However, both the government budget and the current account balance 
deteriorate in the short run (thus possibly exacerbating, rather than smoothing, greener 
consumption side-effects). Significantly, Brownland’ economy ends up paying an increasing 
amount of dividends and interests to Greenland’s investors, which can be unsustainable in the 
medium run – Fig. 6b, 6i and 6l. The impact on industrial emissions and climate change is 
ambiguous, depending on the scale of ecological efficiency gains. Fig. 6c, 6d and 6e show 
that CO2 emissions are initially higher relative to the baseline, because output increase is too 
rapid. The worsening of real economy conditions can affect firms’ financial indices in the long 
run, while banks are more exposed in the short run, due to the reduction in their profit margin. 
No major side-effect for Greenland is recorded instead.  
 Increase of green government spending (Fig. 7). Arguably, the most effective policy in our 
artificial economy is Greenland government policies aiming at supporting green investment. 
This policy can generate a green innovation cascade (see Deleidi and Mazzucato 2018, 
Deleidi et al. 2019) that boosts private activity, while offsetting (or smoothing) its impact on 




Fig. 7a shows that Brownland’s economy takes advantage from Greenland’s policy too. The 
effect is only temporary though. For it is progressively counterbalanced by the appreciation of 
Brownland currency. This, in turn, is due to the higher deficit (or lower surplus) recorded by 
Greenland’s current account balance (because of the fall in net export) – Fig. 7b, 7i and 7l. In 
addition, Fig. 7c and 7e remind us that the reduction in CO2 emissions is anything but obvious. 
Despite the higher share of low-carbon investments and green innovation, economic growth 
may well outstrip any efficiency gain – Fig. 7d. Looking at the financial side, balance sheets of 
both banks and firms are quite sound in Greenland. Paradoxically, Brownland households’ 
wealth is gradually eroded by the appreciation of their currency, which affects income and 
hence saving. Brownland’s banks are also affected – see Fig. 7f, 7g, 7h, 7j and 7k.14 The only 
way to take full advantage from government green-oriented spending, while limiting its 
possible side effects, is for the two areas to pursue green expansionary policies in a 
simultaneous way.    
5. Conclusions 
We have developed an ecological open-economy SFC model that enables testing cross-area 
and cross-sector effects on productive sectors, financial markets and the ecosystem. We have 
argued that an unequal technical progress across areas, coupled with rising ecological 
awareness of investors and consumers, can force governments of less ecologically-efficient 
areas to reduce international trade and move further away from low-carbon assets. This 
                                                 
13 See equations (45)-(48), (56)-(59) and (221)-(224).  
14 See Fig. 7b displaying the same shock under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
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paradoxical effect goes along with possible financial instability and higher industrial emissions 
per unit of output. Our main findings can be summarised as follows: 
a) The search for safe financial assets (brought about by climate-related uncertainty) can 
worsen, rather than improve, financial stability. 
b) The search for green financial assets can boost, rather than smooth, climate change.  
c) Green consumption can affect domestic and external financial balances of less 
ecologically-efficient areas. 
d) If governments of less-ecologically efficient areas react by cutting (green) spending, 
this is likely to affect both output and financial stability. 
e) Selective credit rationing, aiming at supporting low-carbon investment, may improve 
ecological efficiency and support economic growth. However, it can also affect current 
account and government balances in the short run 
f) Selective (or green) innovation-oriented government policy is effective in supporting 
growth, while smoothing the impact of anthropic activities on climate. However, it is 
likely to entail side-effects for the other area.  
To conclude, the most important lesson we can learn from our experiments is that the 
effectiveness of green policies depends crucially on the impact of cross-border financial flows 
(and output growth rate differentials) on the exchange rates. On the one hand, currency 
fluctuations bring about unintended consequences, which can undermine beneficial effects of 
low-carbon transition on the environment and on financial stability. On the other hand, a fixed 
exchange regime requires strong coordination to cope with possible external imbalances. 
Consequently, some form of monetary and/or macroeconomic cooperation and coordination 
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Tables and charts 
 
Table 1. Balance-sheet of the two-area economy 
Notes: A ‘+’ before a magnitude denotes an asset, whereas ‘–’ denotes a liability (except for Balance’s entries, where signs are reversed). Floating exchange rates are assumed. Capitalists and 
workers are aggregated and consolidated in the household sector. 
  















Government Central bank Σ 
Money (cash) +𝐻ℎ




𝐵    −𝐻𝑠
𝐵 0 
CB advances   −𝐴𝑑
𝐺  +𝐴𝑑





𝐺   +𝑀ℎ
𝐵  −𝑀𝑠
𝐵   0 
Loans  −𝐿𝑓
𝐺 +𝐿𝑠
𝐺    −𝐿𝑓
𝐵 +𝐿𝑠
𝐵   0 





𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺     0 
B gov. bills +𝐵𝑑









𝐺𝐺    +𝑝𝑒
𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝑑
𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺      0 
B firms’ shares +𝑝𝑒
𝐵 ⋅ 𝑒𝑑




𝐵𝐵    0 
Conv. capital  +𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺      +𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵     +𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 + 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵
 
Green capital  +𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝐺      +𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝐵     +𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 + 𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝐵  
Balance (net worth) −𝑉ℎ
𝐺 −𝑁𝑊𝑓
𝐺 0 −𝑁𝑊𝑔
𝐺 0  −𝑉ℎ
𝐵 −𝑁𝑊𝑓
𝐵  0 −𝑁𝑊𝑔
𝐵  0 −(𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 𝐾𝑔𝑟)   
Σ 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2. Transactions-flow matrix of the two-area economy 


















Government Central bank Σ 
Consumption – 𝐶𝐺 +𝐶𝐺    
∙ 𝑥𝑟𝐺  
– 𝐶𝐵 +𝐶𝐵    0 
Conv. investment  +𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺  [−𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 ]     +𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵  [−𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 ]    0 
Green investment  +𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺  [−𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 ]     +𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵  [−𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 ]    0 
Conv. gov. spend.  +𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺   −𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺    +𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵   −𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵   0 
Green gov. spend.  +𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟
𝐺   −𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟
𝐺    +𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟
𝐵   −𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟
𝐵   0 
G exports to B  +𝑋𝐺     +𝑋𝐵    0 
B exports to G  −𝐼𝑀𝐺     −𝐼𝑀𝐵    0 
Wages +𝜔𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌
𝐺 −𝜔𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌
𝐺    +𝜔𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌
𝐵 −𝜔𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌
𝐵    0 
Taxes – 𝑇𝐺   +𝑇𝐺  – 𝑇𝐵   +𝑇𝐵  0 
Deprec. allowances  – 𝐷𝐴𝐺 [+𝐴𝐹𝐺]     – 𝐷𝐴𝐵 [+𝐴𝐹𝐵]    0 








𝐵    0 
Interests on G bills +𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑑,−1
𝐺𝐺   +𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑏,−1
𝐺  −𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺  +𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑐𝑏,−1
𝐺𝐺  +𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑑,−1
𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺     0 
Interests on B bills +𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑑,−1
𝐺𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵     +𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑑,−1
𝐵𝐵   +𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑏,−1
𝐵  −𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵  +𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑐𝑏,−1
𝐵𝐵  0 
G firms’ dividends +𝐹𝑑
𝐺𝐺 – 𝐹𝑓
𝐺    +𝐹𝑑
𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺     0 
B firms’ dividends +𝐹𝑑
𝐺𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵      +𝐹𝑑
𝐵𝐵
 – 𝐹𝑑
𝐵    0 
Retained profits  [+𝐹𝑢
𝐺]     [+𝐹𝑢









    0 
Banks’ profit (distrib.) +𝐹𝑏
𝐺  – 𝐹𝑏
𝐺   +𝐹𝑏
𝐵  – 𝐹𝑏
𝐵   0 
CB profits    +𝐹𝑐𝑏
𝐺  −𝐹𝑐𝑏
𝐺     +𝐹𝑐𝑏
𝐵  −𝐹𝑐𝑏
𝐵  0 
Δ in cash −Δ𝐻ℎ
𝐺    +Δ𝐻𝑠
𝐺 
∙ 𝑥𝑟𝐺  
−Δ𝐻ℎ
𝐵    +Δ𝐻𝑠
𝐵 0 
Δ in CB advances   +Δ𝐴𝑑
𝐺  −Δ𝐴𝑠
𝐺   +Δ𝐴𝑑
𝐵  −Δ𝐴𝑠
𝐵 0 
Δ  in deposits −Δ𝑀ℎ
𝐺  +Δ𝑀𝑠
𝐺   −Δ𝑀ℎ
𝐵  +Δ𝑀𝑠
𝐵   0 
Δ in loans  +Δ𝐿𝑓
𝐺 −Δ𝐿𝑠
𝐺    +Δ𝐿𝑓
𝐵 −Δ𝐿𝑠
𝐵   0 
20 
 
Notes: A ‘+’ before a magnitude denotes a receipt or a source of funds, whereas ‘–’ denotes a payment or a use of funds. Floating exchange rates are assumed. Capitalists and workers are 
aggregated and consolidated in the household sector. [ ⋅ ] = capital account entry. 𝐴𝐹 = amortisation funds (which are not explicitly modelled, as they are assumed to equal depreciation allowances). 
Subscript ‘𝑒𝐺’ marks capital gains accruing on all shares issued by Greenland firms, regardless of the nationality of investors (similar considerations go for ‘𝑏𝐺’, ‘𝑒𝐵’ and ‘𝐵𝑏’). 
 
 
    





𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺     0 
Δ in B bills −Δ𝐵𝑑





Σ 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Memo: capital gains −𝐶𝐺𝑏
𝐺 − 𝐶𝐺𝑒
𝐺 +𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐺
𝐺   +𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐺
𝐺    −𝐶𝐺𝑏
𝐵 − 𝐶𝐺𝑒
𝐵 +𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐵
𝐵   +𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐵
𝐵    
21 
 



























Inputs   
Extracted matter +𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 + 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵  
Renewable energy  +𝑒𝑟𝐺 + 𝑒𝑟𝐵 
Non-renewable energy +𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐺 + 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐵 +𝑒𝑛𝐺 + 𝑒𝑛𝐵 
Oxygen +𝑂2
𝐺 + 𝑂2
𝐵   
Outputs   
Industrial CO2 emissions −𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺 − 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵  
Waste  −𝑤𝑎𝐺 − 𝑤𝑎𝐵   
Dissipated energy  −𝑒𝑑𝐺 − 𝑒𝑑𝐵 
Change in s.e.s. −Δ𝑘𝑠𝑒
𝐺 − Δ𝑘𝑠𝑒
𝐵   
Σ 0 0 
22 
 















 Worldwide material reserves 
Worldwide non-renewable 
energy reserves 

















𝐵   
CO2 emissions   +𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺 + 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵  
Production of material goods    +𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
𝐵  
Extraction/use of matter/energy −𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵   −𝑒𝑛𝐺 − 𝑒𝑛𝐵   
Net transfer to oceans/biosph.   −(1 − 𝜓1) ∙ (𝐶𝑂2
𝐺 + 𝐶𝑂2
𝐵) − 1  















































































Appendix: the complete model 
The basic model is made up of 225 equations. Exogenous variables and coefficients are more than one hundred and thirty.19 Superscript ‘𝐵’ stands for Brownland, 
while superscript ‘𝐺’ marks Greenland’s variables and parameters. Government conventional spending, 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵[𝐺]
, grows at rate 𝑔𝐺𝑂𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵[𝐺]
> 0 up until 2020 and 0 
afterwards. 
 
Block I. Disposable income, wealth and taxes 
𝑌𝐷𝑟
𝐵  = 𝑌𝑟
𝐵 ⋅ (1 − 𝜃𝐵)        Disposable income capitalists in Brownland – eq. 1 
𝑌𝐷𝑤
𝐵 = 𝑌𝑤





𝐵       Haig-Simons disposable income capitalists in Brownland – eq. 3 
𝐶𝐺𝑏
𝐵 = 𝑑(𝑥𝑟𝐺) ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺         Revaluation of foreign bills held by Brownland capitalists – eq. 4 
𝐶𝐺𝑒
𝐵 = 𝑑(𝑥𝑟𝐺) ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1










𝐵        Wealth accumulation workers in Brownland – eq. 7 
𝑌𝐷𝑟
𝐺  = 𝑌𝑟
𝐺 ⋅ (1 − 𝜃𝐺)        Disposable income capitalists in Greenland – eq. 8 
𝑌𝐷𝑤
𝐺 = 𝑌𝑤





𝐺       Haig-Simons disposable income capitalists in Greenland – eq. 10 
𝐶𝐺𝑏
𝐺 = 𝑑(𝑥𝑟𝐵) ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵         Revaluation of foreign bills held by Greenland capitalists – eq. 11 
𝐶𝐺𝑒
𝐺 = 𝑑(𝑥𝑟𝐵) ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1










𝐺        Wealth accumulation workers in Greenland – eq. 14 
𝑇𝐵 = (𝑌𝑟
𝐵 + 𝑌𝑤
𝐵) ⋅ 𝜃𝐵        Taxes paid in Brownland – eq. 15 
𝑇𝐺 = (𝑌𝑟
𝐺 + 𝑌𝑤
𝐺) ⋅ 𝜃𝐺         Taxes paid in in Greenland – eq. 16 
 






















𝐺        Consumption of capitalists in Greenland eq. – 20 
                                                 
19 The model we simulated is slightly bigger, as it includes some checks and additional calculations. It amounts to 239 endogenous variables and 132 exogenous variables and parameters, 












𝐺 + 𝑋𝐺 − 𝐼𝑀𝐺 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺     Total income in Greenland – eq. 22 
𝑌𝑤
𝐵 = 𝜔 ⋅ 𝑌𝐵        Total income of Brownland workers – eq. 23 
𝑌𝑤
𝐺 = 𝜔𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐺         Total income of Greenland workers – eq. 24 
𝐹𝑓
𝐵 = 𝑌𝐵 − 𝑌𝑤
𝐵 − 𝐷𝐴𝐵 − 𝑟𝑙,−1
𝐵 ⋅ 𝐿𝑓,−1
𝐵      Gross profit of Brownland firms – eq. 25 
𝐹𝑢
𝐵 = 𝐹𝑓














𝐵 + 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐵 + 𝑥𝑟𝐺 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺 + 𝐹𝑑,−1
𝐵𝐵 + 𝐹𝑑,−1
𝐵𝐺   Total income of Brownland capitalists – eq. 29 
𝐹𝑑
𝐵𝐺 = 𝑥𝑟𝐺 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠




𝐵𝐵        Dividends paid by Brownland firms to Brownland shareholders – eq. 31 
𝐹𝑓
𝐺 = 𝑌𝐺 − 𝑌𝑤
𝐺 − 𝐷𝐴𝐺 − 𝑟𝑙,−1
𝐺 ⋅ 𝐿𝑓,−1
𝐺       Gross profit of Greenland firms – eq. 32 
𝐹𝑢
𝐺 = 𝐹𝑓










𝐺        Compensations of Greenland firms’ managers – eq. 35 
𝑌𝑟
𝐺 =  𝐹𝑚
𝐺 + 𝐹𝑏
𝐺 + 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐺 + 𝑥𝑟𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵 + 𝐹𝑑,−1
𝐺𝐵 + 𝐹𝑑,−1
𝐺𝐺   Total income of Greenland capitalists – eq. 36 
𝐹𝑑
𝐺𝐵 =  𝑥𝑟𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠
𝐺𝐵        Dividends paid by Brownland firms to Greenland shareholders – eq. 37 
𝐹𝑑
𝐺𝐺 =  𝑟𝑒
𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠
𝐺𝐺          Dividends paid by Greenland firms to Greenland shareholders – eq. 38 
 
Block III. Firms’ investment plans 
𝐾𝐵 = 𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝐵  + 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛










𝐵       Accumulation of conventional capital in Brownland – eq. 41 
𝐷𝐴𝐵 = 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐵 + 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵         Total depreciation allowances in Brownland – eq. 42 
𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐵 = 𝛿𝐵 ⋅ 𝐾𝑔𝑟,−1
𝐵        Depreciation allowances of green capital in Brownland – eq. 43 
𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 𝛿𝐵 ⋅ 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛,−1
𝐵        Depreciation allowances of conventional capital in Brownland – eq. 44 
𝐾𝐵
𝑡  = 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑌−1
𝐵         Capital stock target in Brownland – eq. 45 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵 = 𝛾𝐵 ⋅ (𝐾𝐵
𝑡 − 𝐾𝐵,−1) + 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐵 + 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛





𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌𝐵 − 𝜒3
𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟𝑙
𝐵), 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵)   Demand for green investment in Brownland – eq. 47 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵 − 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟





𝐵 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵 − 𝐷𝐴𝐵 − 𝐹𝑢
𝐵 − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠
𝐺𝐵) − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠
𝐵𝐵)   Demand for bank loans by Brownland firms – eq. 49 
𝐾𝐺 = 𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝐺 + 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛










𝐺      Accumulation of conventional capital in Greenland – eq. 52 
𝐷𝐴𝐺 = 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐺 + 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺         Total depreciation allowances in Greenland – eq. 53 
𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐺 = 𝛿𝐺 ⋅ 𝐾𝑔𝑟,−1
𝐺        Depreciation allowances of green capital in Greenland – eq. 54 
𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 = 𝛿𝐺 ⋅ 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛,−1
𝐺        Depreciation allowances of conventional capital in Greenland – eq. 55 
𝐾𝐺
𝑡  = 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑌−1
𝐺         Capital stock target in Brownland – eq. 56 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺 = 𝛾𝐵 ⋅ (𝐾𝐺
𝑡 − 𝐾𝐺,−1) + 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐺 + 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛





𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐺 − 𝜒3
𝐺 ⋅ 𝑟𝑙
𝐺), 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺)   Demand for green investment in Greenland – eq. 58 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺 − 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟
𝐺        Conventional investment in Greenland – eq. 59 
𝐿𝑓
𝐺 = 𝐿𝑓,−1
𝐺 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺 − 𝐷𝐴𝐺 − 𝐹𝑢
𝐺 − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠
𝐵𝐺) − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠
𝐺𝐺)   Demand for bank loans by Greenland firms – eq. 60 
 
Block IV. International trade  
log(𝑋𝐵) = 𝜀0 − 𝜀1 ⋅ log(𝑥𝑟𝐵,−1) + 𝜀2 ⋅ log 𝑌𝐺    Exports of Brownland – eq. 61 
log(𝐼𝑀𝐵) = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1 ⋅ log(𝑥𝑟𝐵,−1) + 𝜇2 ⋅ log(𝑌𝐵)    Imports of Brownland – eq. 62 
𝑋𝐺 = 𝐼𝑀𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵        Exports of Greenland – eq. 63 
𝐼𝑀𝐺 = 𝑥𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵         Imports of Greenland – eq. 64 
 




𝐵 = 𝜆10 + 𝜆11 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆12 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆13 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 − 𝜆14 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒




𝐵 = 𝜆20 − 𝜆21 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 + 𝜆22 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆23 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 − 𝜆24 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒




𝐵 = 𝜆70 − 𝜆71 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆72 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆73 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 + 𝜆74 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒




𝐵 = 𝜆90 − 𝜆91 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆92 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 + 𝜆93 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 − 𝜆94 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒














𝐵𝐺) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 − 𝑀𝑟
𝐵    Holding of money in cash by capitalists in Brownland – eq. 70 
𝑀𝑤
𝐵 = 𝑉𝑊




𝐵         Holding of money in cash by workers in Brownland – eq. 72 
𝐻ℎ
𝐵  = 𝐻𝑤
𝐵 + 𝐻𝑟






𝐺 = 𝜆40 − 𝜆41 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 + 𝜆42 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆43 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 − 𝜆44 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒




𝐺 = 𝜆50 + 𝜆51 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆52 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆53 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 − 𝜆54 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒




𝐺 = 𝜆80 − 𝜆81 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆82 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 + 𝜆83 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 − 𝜆84 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒




𝐺 = 𝜆100 − 𝜆101 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆102 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆103 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 + 𝜆104 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒














𝐺𝐵) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵 − 𝑀𝑟
𝐺    Holding of money in cash by capitalists in Greenland – eq. 79 
𝑀𝑤
𝐺 = 𝑉𝑊




𝐺         Holding of money in cash by workers in Greenland – eq. 81 
𝐻ℎ
𝐺  = 𝐻𝑤
𝐺 + 𝐻𝑟
𝐺         Total holding of money in cash in Greenland – eq. 82 
 
Block VI. Supplies and prices of financial assets (equilibrium conditions) 
𝐵𝑠
𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵𝑑
𝐵𝐵        Supply of Brownland bills to Brownland households (capitalists) – eq. 83 
𝐵𝑠
𝐺𝐺 = 𝐵𝑑
𝐺𝐺         Supply of Greenland bills to Greenland households (capitalists) – eq. 84 
𝐵𝑠
𝐺𝐵 = 𝐵𝑑
𝐺𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺          Supply of Brownland bills to Greenland households (capitalists) – eq. 85 
𝐵𝑠
𝐵𝐺 = 𝐵𝑑
𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵        Supply of Greenland bills to Brownland households (capitalists) – eq. 86 
𝐸𝑠
𝐵𝐺 = 𝐸𝑑
𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵        Nominal supply of Greenland shares to Brownland capitalists - eq. 87  
𝐸𝑠
𝐺𝐺 = 𝐸𝑑
𝐺𝐺         Nominal supply of Greenland shares to Greenland capitalists - eq. 88 
𝑒𝑠
𝐺 = 𝑒𝑠,−1
𝐺 + 𝜉𝐺 ⋅
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺,−1
𝑝𝑒,−1







𝐺         Unit price of shares issued by Greenland firms - eq. 90  
𝐸𝑠
𝐺𝐵 = 𝐸𝑑
𝐺𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺        Nominal supply of Brownland shares to Greenland capitalists - eq. 91  
𝐸𝑠
𝐵𝐵 = 𝐸𝑑
𝐵𝐵        Nominal supply of Brownland shares to Brownland capitalists - eq. 92 
𝑒𝑠
𝐵 = 𝑒𝑠,−1
𝐵 + 𝜉𝐵 ⋅
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵,−1
𝑝𝑒,−1







𝐵         Unit price of shares issued by Brownland firms - eq. 94  
𝑟𝑒
𝐺 = (1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑦
𝐺 ) ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 + 𝜋𝑑𝑦
𝐺 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒












𝐵 = (1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑦
𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 + 𝜋𝑑𝑦
𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒







𝐵         Return rate on Brownland firms’ equity - eq. 98 
 
 




𝐵        Supply of deposits in Brownland (liabilities of Brownland banks) – eq. 99 
𝐿𝑠
𝐵 = 𝐿𝑓




𝐵        Brownland bills notionally bought by Brownland banks – eq. 101 
𝜁𝐵 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝐵 > 0       Trigger for notional Brownland bills bought by Brownland banks – eq. 102 
𝐵𝑏
𝐵 = 𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝐵 ⋅ 𝜁𝐵        Brownland bills actually bought by Brownland bank – eq. 103 
𝐴𝑑
𝐵 = −𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝐵 ⋅ (1 − 𝜁𝐵)       Advances needed by Brownland banks from Brownland central bank – eq. 104 
𝐴𝑠
𝐵 = 𝐴𝑑
𝐵         Advances provided to Brownland banks by Brownland central bank – eq. 105 
𝐹𝑏
𝐵 = 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑏,−1
𝐵 + 𝑟𝑙
𝐵 ⋅ 𝐿𝑠,−1




𝐺         Supply of deposits in Greenland (liabilities of Brownland banks) – eq. 107 
𝐿𝑠
𝐺 = 𝐿𝑓




𝐺        Greenland bills notionally bought by Greenland banks – eq. 109 
𝜁𝐺 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝐺 > 0       Trigger for notional Greenland bills bought by Greenland bank – eq. 110 
𝐵𝑏
𝐺 = 𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝐺 ⋅ 𝜁𝐺        Greenland bills actually bought by Greenland banks – eq. 111 
𝐴𝑑
𝐺 = −𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝐺 ⋅ (1 − 𝜁𝐺)       Advances needed by Greenland banks from Greenland central bank – eq. 112 
𝐴𝑠
𝐺 = 𝐴𝑑
𝐺         Advances provided to Greenland banks by Greenland central bank – eq. 113 
𝐹𝑏
𝐺 = 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑏,−1
𝐺 + 𝑟𝑙
𝐺 ⋅ 𝐿𝑠,−1
𝐺       Profits of banks in Greenland – eq. 114 
 










𝐵        Supply of cash in Brownland – eq. 116 
𝐹𝑐𝑏
𝐵 = 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑐𝑏,−1










𝐺         Supply of cash in Greenland – eq. 119 
𝐹𝑐𝑏
𝐺 = 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑐𝑏,−1














𝐵 + 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵 − 𝑇𝐵 − 𝐹𝑐𝑏




𝐺 + 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺 − 𝑇𝐺 − 𝐹𝑐𝑏
𝐺     Government budget constraint in Greenland – eq. 124 
 


















         Greenland exchange rate – eq. 126 
 
Block X. The ecosystem: material resources and reserves 
𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
𝐵 = 𝜇𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌𝐵         Production of material goods in Brownland – eq. 127 
𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
𝐺 = 𝜇𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐺         Production of material goods in Greenland – eq. 128 
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵 = 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
𝐵 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝐵        Extraction of matter in Brownland – eq. 129 
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 = 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
𝐺 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝐺        Extraction of matter in Greenland – eq. 130  
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝐵 = 𝜌𝐵 ⋅ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐵         Recycled socio-economic stock in Brownland – eq. 131 
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝐺 = 𝜌𝐺 ⋅ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐺         Recycled socio-economic stock in Greenland – eq. 131 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐵 = 𝜇𝐵 ⋅ (𝐷𝐴𝐵 + 𝐶𝑤,−1
𝐵 + 𝐶𝑟,−1
𝐵 − 𝑋𝐵,−1 + 𝐼𝑀𝐵,−1)    Discarded socio-economic stock in Brownland – eq. 133  
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐺 = 𝜇𝐺 ⋅ (𝐷𝐴𝐺 + 𝐶𝑤,−1
𝐺 + 𝐶𝑟,−1








𝐺 − 𝜇𝐺 ⋅ (𝑋𝐺,−1 − 𝐼𝑀𝐺,−1) − 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐺      Socio-economic stock in Greenland – eq. 136 
𝑤𝑎𝐵 = 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵 − 𝑑(𝑘𝑠𝑒
𝐵 )        Waste generated by production activities in Brownland – eq. 137 
𝑤𝑎𝐺 = 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 − 𝑑(𝑘𝑠𝑒








𝐺 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺  '      Stock of material reserves in Greenland – eq. 140 
𝑘𝑚 = 𝑘𝑚
𝐵 + 𝑘𝑚
















𝐺        Stock of material resources in Greenland – eq. 145 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚
𝐵 + 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚
𝐺        World-wide stock of material resources – eq. 146  
                                                 










         Carbon mass of (non-renewable) energy in Greenland – eq. 148 
𝑜2𝐵 = 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐵       Mass of oxygen in Brownland – eq. 149 
𝑜2𝐺 = 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐺        Mass of oxygen in Greenland – eq. 150 
 
Block XI. The ecosystem: energy resources and reserves 
𝑒𝐵 = 𝜖𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌𝐵        Energy required for production in Brownland – eq. 151 
𝑒𝑟𝐵 = 𝜂𝐵 ⋅ 𝑒𝐵        Renewable energy in Brownland – eq. 152 
𝑒𝑛𝐵 = 𝑒𝐵 − 𝑒𝑟𝐵        Non-renewable energy in Brownland – eq. 153 
𝑒𝑑𝐵 = 𝑒𝑟𝐵 + 𝑒𝑛𝐵         Dissipated energy at the end of the period in Brownland – eq. 154 
𝑒𝐺 = 𝜖𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐺         Energy required for production in Greenland – eq. 155 
𝑒𝑟𝐺 = 𝜂𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝐺        Renewable energy in Greenland – eq. 156 
𝑒𝑛𝐺 = 𝑒𝐺 − 𝑒𝑟𝐺         Non-renewable energy in Greenland – eq. 157 








𝐺 − 𝑒𝑛𝐺       Stock of energy reserves in Greenland – eq. 160 
𝑘𝑒 = 𝑘𝑒
𝐵 + 𝑘𝑒
















𝐺        Stock of energy resources in Greenland – eq. 165 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒
𝐵 + 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒
𝐺        World-wide stock of energy resources – eq. 166 
 
Block XII. The ecosystem: emissions and climate change 
𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵 = 𝛽𝐵 ⋅ 𝑒𝑛𝐵        Industrial emissions of CO2 in Brownland – eq. 167 
𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺 = 𝛽𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝑛𝐺         Industrial emissions of CO2 in Greenland – eq. 168 
𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 = 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑏 + 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑔       World-wide industrial emissions of CO2 – eq. 169  
𝑐𝑜2𝐵 = 𝜓𝑏 ⋅ 𝑐𝑜2𝐵,−1 + 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵      Cumulative emissions of CO2 in Brownland – eq. 170 
𝑐𝑜2𝐺 = 𝜓𝐺 ⋅ 𝑐𝑜2𝐺,−1 + 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺       Cumulative emissions of CO2 in Greenland – eq. 171 
𝑐𝑜2 = 𝑐𝑜2𝐵 + 𝑐𝑜2𝐺        World-wide cumulative emissions of CO2 – eq. 172 




























































































      Renewable energy share in Greenland – eq. 182 
 




















𝐺         Energy depletion ratio in Greenland – eq. 186 
𝛿𝐵 = 𝛿𝐵,−1 + 𝛿11 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚
𝐵 ) + 𝛿12 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝐵) + 𝛿13 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝)  Depreciation of capital stock in Brownland – eq. 187 
𝛿𝐺 = 𝛿𝐺,−1 + 𝛿21 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚
𝐺 ) + 𝛿22 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝐺) + 𝛿23 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝)  Depreciation of capital stock in Greenland – eq. 188 
𝛼1𝑤
𝐵 = 𝛼1𝑤,−1
𝐵 + 𝛼11 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑚
𝐵 ) + 𝛼12 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝐵) + 𝛼13 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝) Propensity to consume of workers in Brownland – eq. 189 
𝛼1𝑤
𝐺 = 𝛼1𝑤,−1
𝐺 + 𝛼21 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑚
𝐺 ) + 𝛼22 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝐺) + 𝛼23 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝) Propensity to consume of workers in Greenland – eq. 190 
 
Block XV. Auxiliary equations for domestic and foreign balances  
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐵 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐵 + 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵 − 𝑇𝐵 − 𝐹𝑐𝑏,−1
𝐵     Government deficit in Brownland – eq. 191  
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐺 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺 − 𝑇𝐺 − 𝐹𝑐𝑏,−1
𝐺     Government deficit in Greenland – eq. 192 
𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐴𝐵 = 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐵 + 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐵       Net accumulation of financial assets in Brownland – eq. 193 
𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐴𝐺 = 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐺 + 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐺        Net accumulation of financial assets in Greenland - eq. 194 
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𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 𝑇𝐵𝐵 + 𝑥𝑟𝐺 ⋅ (𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺 + 𝑟𝑒,−1
𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺 ) − 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵 − 𝑟𝑒,−1
𝐵 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵   Current account balance of Brownland – eq. 195 
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐺 = 𝑇𝐵𝐺 + 𝑥𝑟𝐵 ⋅ (𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵 + 𝑟𝑒,−1
𝐵 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵 ) − 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺 − 𝑟𝑒,−1
𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺  Current account balance of Greenland – eq. 196 
𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐵 = −𝑑(𝐵𝑠
𝐵𝐺) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 + 𝑑(𝐵𝑠
𝐺𝐵) − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠
𝐵𝐺) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 + 𝑑(𝐸𝑠
𝐺𝐵)   Financial account balance of Brownland – eq. 1907 
𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐺 = −𝑑(𝐵𝑠
𝐺𝐵) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵 + 𝑑(𝐵𝑠
𝐵𝐺) − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠
𝐺𝐵) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵 + 𝑑(𝐸𝑠
𝐵𝐺)  Financial account balance of Greenland – eq. 198 
𝑇𝐵𝐵 = 𝑋𝐵 − 𝐼𝑀𝐵        Trade balance of Brownland – eq. 199 
𝑇𝐵𝐺 = 𝑋𝐺 − 𝐼𝑀𝐺         Trade balance of Greenland – eq. 200 
𝐵𝑃𝐵 = 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐵 + 𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐵       Balance of payment of Brownland – eq. 201 
𝐵𝑃𝐺 = 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐺 + 𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐺       Balance of payment of Greenland – eq. 202 
 
Block XVI. National product and inequality indices 
𝐺𝑁𝑃𝐵 = 𝑌𝐵 + 𝑥𝑟𝐺 ⋅ (𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺 + 𝑟𝑒,−1
𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺 ) − 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵 − 𝑟𝑒,−1
𝐵 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵   Gross National product of Brownland – eq. 203 
𝐺𝑁𝑃𝐺 = 𝑌𝐺 + 𝑥𝑟𝐵 ⋅ (𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵 + 𝑟𝑒,−1
𝐵 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵 ) − 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺 − 𝑟𝑒,−1
𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1








































𝐺         Wealth inequality index in Brownland – eq. 212 
 


























































𝐵         Liquidity ratio of Brownland banks - eq. 220 
 
Block XVIII. Credit rationing and other shocks 
𝛾𝐺 = 𝛾10 − 𝛾11 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺,−1 − 𝛾12 ⋅ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑓,−1
𝐺 + 𝛾13 ⋅ 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑏,−1




 Speed of adjustment of capital to target level in Greenland - eq. 221 
𝑟𝑙
𝐺 = 𝑟𝑙,−1




       Interest rate on bank loans in Greenland - eq. 222 
𝛾𝐵 = 𝛾20 − 𝛾21 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵,−1 − 𝛾22 ⋅ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑓,−1
𝐵 + 𝛾23 ⋅ 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑏,−1




 Speed of adjustment of capital to target level in Brownland - eq. 223 
𝑟𝑙
𝐵 = 𝑟𝑙,−1




       Interest rate on bank loans in Brownland - eq. 224 
𝜇2 = 𝜇2,−1 + 𝛾3 ⋅ 𝑑(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟





𝐵         Supply of cash matches demand for cash in Brownland 
𝐻𝑠
𝐺 = 𝐻ℎ






Table 5. Initial values of variables and coefficient values for the baseline and the experiments 
Starting values of parameters of the two open economies 
Symbols and baseline 
values 
Values under alternative scenarios 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
Brownland capitalists’ propensity to consume out of income 𝛼1𝑟
𝐵 = 0.65       
Brownland workers’ propensity to consume out of income 𝛼1𝑤
𝐵 = 0.85       
Greenland capitalists’ propensity to consume out of income 𝛼1𝑟
𝐺 = 0.65       
Greenland workers’ propensity to consume out of income 𝛼1𝑤
𝐺 = 0.85       
Brownland capitalists’ propensity to consume out of wealth 𝛼2𝑟
𝐵 = 0.13333       
Brownland workers’ propensity to consume out of wealth 𝛼2𝑤
𝐵 = 0.13333       
Greenland capitalists’ propensity to consume out of wealth 𝛼2𝑟
𝐺 = 0.13333       
Greenland workers’ propensity to consume out of wealth 𝛼2𝑤
𝐺 = 0.13333       
Parameter in Brownland export equation 𝜀0 = −2.1       
Parameter in Brownland export equation 𝜀1 = 0.5       
Parameter in Brownland export equation 𝜀2 = 1.228   1.226   [1.226] 
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists    𝜆10 = 0.3 0.305 0.299     
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists    𝜆11 = 1       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists    𝜆12 = 1       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists    𝜆13 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists    𝜆14 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists 𝜆20 = 0.1  0.101     
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists 𝜆21 = 1       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists 𝜆22 = 1       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists 𝜆23 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists 𝜆24 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆40 =  0.3 0.305 0.301     
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆41 = 1       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆42 = 1       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆43 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆44 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆50 = 0.1  0.099     
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆51 = 1       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆52 = 1       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆53 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists 𝜆54 = 0       
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Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆70 = 0.05 0 0.051     
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆71 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆72 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆73 = 0.01       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆74 = 0.01       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆75 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists 𝜆80 = 0.05 0 0.049     
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists 𝜆81 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists 𝜆82 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists 𝜆83 = 0.01       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists 𝜆84 = 0.01       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆90 = 0.1 0 0.09     
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆91 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆92 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆93 = 0.01       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆94 = 0.01       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Greenland capitalists 𝜆100 = 0.1 0 0.101     
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆101 = 0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆102 =  0       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆103 = 0.01       
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists 𝜆104 = 0.01       
Shares issues to investment ratio in Greenland 𝜉𝐺 = 0.01       
Shares issues to investment ratio in Brownland 𝜉𝐵 = 0.01       
Real supply of shares in Brownland 𝑒𝑠
𝐵 = 1       
Real supply of shares in Greenland 𝑒𝑠
𝐺 = 1       
Unit price of shares in Brownland 𝑝𝑒
𝐵 = 1       
Unit price of shares in Greenland 𝑝𝑒
𝐺 = 1       
Parameter in Brownland import equation 𝜇0 = − 2.1       
Parameter in Brownland import equation 𝜇1 = 0.5       
Parameter in Brownland import equation 𝜇2 = 1.228   1.23   [1.23] 
Average tax rate in Brownland 𝜃𝐵 = 0.2       
Average tax rate in Greenland 𝜃𝐺 = 0.2       
Depreciation rate in Brownland 𝛿𝐵 = 0.08       
Depreciation rate in Greenland 𝛿𝐺 = 0.08       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland 𝛾10 = 0.1603       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland 𝛾11 = 0.1       
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Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland 𝛾12 = 0.01       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland 𝛾13 = 0.01       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland 𝛾14 = 0       
Sensitivity of loan interest rate to green investment share in Greenland 𝛾15 =  0       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland 𝛾20 = 0.1603       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland 𝛾21 = 0.1       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland 𝛾22 = 0.01       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland 𝛾23 = 0.01       
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland 𝛾24 = 0     0.1  
Sensitivity of loan interest rate to green investment share in Brownland 𝛾25 =  0     0.08  
Sensitivity of Brownland import to government spending 𝛾3 = 0    0.015   
Target capital to output ratio 𝜅 = 0.85       
Parameter of Brownland green investment function 𝜒1
𝐵 = 0.2       
Parameter of Brownland green investment function 𝜒2
𝐵 = 0.02       
Parameter of Brownland green investment function 𝜒3
𝐵 = 0       
Parameter of Greenland green investment function 𝜒1
𝐺 = 0.2       
Parameter of Greenland green investment function 𝜒2
𝐺 = 0.02       
Parameter of Greenland green investment function 𝜒3
𝐺  = 0     0.08  
Wage share to total income in Brownland 𝜔𝐵 = 0.62       
Wage share to total income in Greenland 𝜔𝐺 = 0.62       
Profit retention rate of Brownland firms 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐵 = 0.02       
Profit retention rate of Greenland firms 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐺 = 0.02       
Percentage of money held in Brownland deposits 𝜈𝐵 = 0.7 0.69      
Percentage of money held in Greenland deposits 𝜈𝐺 = 0.7 0.69      
Parameter defining dividend yield in Greenland 𝜋𝑑𝑦
𝐺 = 0.00555       
Parameter defining dividend yield in Brownland 𝜋𝑑𝑦
𝐵 = 0.00555       
        
Starting values of variables and parameter values for the ecosystem        
Material intensity of green capital in Brownland (Kg/USD)  𝜇𝑔𝑟
𝐵 = 0.71       
Material intensity of green capital in Greenland (Kg/USD) 𝜇𝑔𝑟
𝐺 = 0.51       
Material intensity of conventional capital in Brownland (Kg/USD) 𝜇𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 0.86       
Material intensity of conventional capital in Greenland (Kg/USD) 𝜇𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 = 0.66       
Energy intensity of green capital in Brownland (Ej/USD)  𝜖𝑔𝑟
𝐵 = 7.65       
Energy intensity of green capital in Greenland (Ej/USD) 𝜖𝑔𝑟
𝐺 = 5.65       
Energy intensity of conventional capital in Brownland (Ej/USD) 𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 9.32       
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Energy intensity of conventional capital in Greenland (Ej/USD) 𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 = 7.32       
CO2 intensity of green capital in Brownland (Gt/Ej 𝛽𝑔𝑟
𝐵 = 0.045       
CO2 intensity of green capital in Greenland (Gt/Ej)  𝛽𝑔𝑟
𝐺 = 0.025       
CO2 intensity of conventional capital in Brownland (Gt/Ej)  𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 0.085       
CO2 intensity of conventional capital in Greenland (Gt/Ej)  𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 = 0.065       
Rate of decline of CO2 intensity in Brownland after 2020  𝑔𝛽
𝐵 = 0.02       
Rate of decline of CO2 intensity in Greenland after 2020 𝑔𝛽
𝐺 = 0.04       
Initial value of CO2 emissions in Brownland  𝛽0
𝐵 = 4.5       
Initial value of CO2 emissions in Greenland  𝛽0
𝐺 = 4.5       
Autoregressive parameter of cumulative CO2 emissions in Brownland (accounting for 
carbon cycle)  
𝜓𝐵 = 0.999       
Autoregressive parameter of cumulative CO2 emissions in Greenland (accounting for 
carbon cycle)  
𝜓𝐺 = 0.999       
Approximate value of cumulative CO2 emissions of Brownland in 1950s (billion tonnes 
CO2, Gt)  
𝑐𝑜2𝐵 = 300        
Approximate value of cumulative CO2 emissions of Greenland in 1950s (billion tonnes 
CO2, Gt) 
𝑐𝑜2𝐺 = 300       
Initial value of average atmospheric temperature (C) 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 =  13       
Sensitivity of temperature to Brownland emissions  𝜏𝐵 =  7.69𝑒 − 4       
Sensitivity of temperature to Greenland emissions  𝜏𝐺 =  7.69𝑒 − 4       
Recycling rate in Brownland 𝜌𝐵 = 0.2       
Recycling rate in Greenland 𝜌𝐺 = 0.28       
Conversion rate of material resources into reserves in Brownland  𝜎𝑚
𝐵 = 0.00028       
Conversion rate of material resources into reserves in Greenland  𝜎𝑚
𝐺 = 0.00028       
Conversion rate of non-renewable energy resources into reserves in Brownland  𝜎𝑒
𝐵 = 0.0014       
Conversion rate of non-renewable energy resources into reserves in Greenland  𝜎𝑒
𝐺 = 0.0014       
Initial value of matter resources of Brownland (Gt)  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚
𝐵 = 198,526.       
Initial value of matter resources of Greenland (Gt)  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚
𝐺 = 198,526.4       
Initial value of non-renewable energy resources of Brownland (Ej)  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒
𝐵 = 296,421.3       
Initial value of non-renewable energy resources of Greenland (Ej)  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒
𝐺 = 296,421.3       
Initial value of socio-economic stock of Brownland (Gt)  𝑘𝑠𝑒
𝐵 = 380       
Initial value of socio-economic stock of Brownland (Gt)  𝑘𝑠𝑒
𝐺 = 380       
Coefficient converting Gt of carbon into Gt of CO2  𝑐𝑎𝑟 = 3.67       
Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Brownland firms to matter depletion  𝛿11 = 0       
Initial value of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Brownland firms to energy depl. 𝛿12 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Brownland firms to climate change 𝛿13 = 0       
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Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Greenland firms to matter depletion 𝛿21 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Greenland firms to energy depletion 𝛿22 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Greenland firms to climate change 𝛿23 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Brownland workers to matter depletion  𝛼11 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Brownland workers to energy depletion  𝛼12 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Brownland workers to climate change  𝛼13 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Greenland workers to matter depletion  𝛼21 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Greenland workers to energy depletion  𝛼22 = 0       
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Greenland workers to climate change  𝛼23 =  0       
Share of renewable energy to total energy in Brownland, conventional capital  𝜂𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 0       
Share of renewable energy to total energy in Greenland, conventional capital 𝜂𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 =  0.05       
Share of renewable energy to total energy in Brownland, green capital 𝜂𝑔𝑟
𝐵 = 0.075       
Share of renewable energy to total energy in Greenland, green capital 𝜂𝑔𝑟
𝐺 = 0.15       
        
Starting values of exogenous variables for the two open economies        
Government green spending in Brownland 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟
𝐵 = 1    0.05  1.1 
Government green spending in Greenland 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟
𝐺 = 1       
Government conventional spending in Brownland 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 0.25       
Government conventional spending in Greenland 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 = 0.25       
Growth rate of government conventional spending in Brownland up until 2020 𝑔𝐺𝑂𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 0.0495       
Growth rate of government conventional spending in Brownland up until 2020 𝑔𝐺𝑂𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 = 0.0495       
Return rate on government bonds in Brownland 𝑟𝐵 = 0.03       
Return rate on government bonds in Greenland 𝑟𝐺 = 0.03       
Interest rate on loans in Brownland 𝑟𝑙
𝐵 = 0.03       
Interest rate on loans in Greenland 𝑟𝑙
𝐺 = 0.03       
        
Starting values for endogenous variables with lag for the two open economies        
Exchange rate 𝑥𝑟𝐵 = 𝑥𝑟𝐺 =  1       
Return rate on equity & shares in Brownland 𝑟𝑒
𝐺 = 0.03       
Return rate on equity & shares in Greenland 𝑟𝑒
𝐵 = 0.03       
Notes: narrowly-defined economic and financial parameters of each area are taken from SFC modelling literature or calibrated to obtain a realistic baseline. Ecological coefficients are based on Dafermos et al. 
(2017, 2018) and IPCC (2018). Simulations are run beginning from 1952. Starting values of financial stocks and all remaining lagged endogenous variables are set to zero.  
 
 
